Panzergrenadier Photo Album Pt 2 - Army Group Center - Eduard Dietl - Otto Remer - Operation Typhoon

SUPPORT THE CHANNEL and get access to exclusive film footage

www.Patreon.com/Military1945

This is a part of a 1944 panzer grenadier training film which fits in well with today material. We’re continuing with the 1943-44 photo album that shows a cavalry unit which eventually converted into a PzGr. formation. I’ll talk about how cavalry units were used by the Wehrmacht and we’ll see some associated private training footage. Finally, responding to a comment string in the last video, I talk about leadership styles in the Wehrmacht. At the end of this video you can see more of the Panzergrenadier training film so stick around.

Our mystery photographer was not part of this bicycle unit that was also training in northern Germany in the spring of 1943. In the following pages we see his regiment training to become a cavalry formation.

That mobile fighting units that were not motorized were still being formed in 1943 is interesting. Experience with the harsh Russian Winters had proven that non-tracked vehicles were often immobilized.

tracked vehicles generally didn’t have the same problem of getting constantly bogged down but they too suffered mechanical difficulties caused by the biting cold. That’s really nice footage from Army Group Center from 1943. Motorized and mechanized elements, they simply couldn’t compete with the mobility offered by cavalry.

In the Winter, cavalry units performed better and with the increasing problem of resupply, horses could better live off the land.

A number of photographs like this one show the soldiers with their horses out in the field which is good evidence that the photographer himself was on horseback.

During the Soviet counter offensive during the Winter of 1941/42, the Germans, through necessity, began organizing mobilized defensive formations that could be rushed to critical locations along the front. In this role the cavalry units had shown their effectiveness.

Here we see private footage of the training of a cavalry unit in 1941. It’s a misconception that such units attacked on horseback. The horses were used to transport the light infantry to their area of operation where the soldiers would then dismount and act as regular infantry.

At the firing range, this sign reads, no mounted horsemen. The cavalrymen are training on an MG34. Obviously there was never any intention of firing automatic weapons like this from horseback.

And here, I believe, we finally get to see a picture of the photographer. In these photos he seems to be back home on leave. If you recognize any of the locations please let me know in the comment section.

Here I’d like to reflect on a comment string that can be found on part one in this series which referred to the pleasant manner that the officers and men were interacting in the training film clip. The comments left give good insight into why this might be.

Adding to what was left, Wehrmacht officers had the freedom to interact with their subordinates in the way that they believed would achieve the best results. Competent leaders who treated their men with respect and were sincerely interested in their wellbeing were often beloved in return. An example would be General Eduard Dietel, who was in charge of the 20th Mountain Army.

He first gained prominence during the Norwegian campaign and became known as the hero of Narvik. Later during Barbarossa, he was in command far to the north in the push towards Murmansk. Dietl was known for leading from the front, experiencing the same hardships as his men and making sure that his injured soldiers were well taken care of. He had a natural way of interacting that can be clearly seen in the limited film footage that we have.

In contrast, less competent or insecure leaders could treat their subordinates with contempt or even aggression. An example would be Otto Ernst Remer, who played a major role in putting down the failed military putsch which took place after the botched assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20 of 1944. For his actions he was immediately promoted two ranks to become a Colonel and portrayed as a national hero in the news. Realizing himself that he was, to say the least a controversial figure, he played this propaganda role to the hilt.

Had Remer been promoted because of his effective leader skills? No, he’d became the characakture of what the world expected a Nazi to be.