2025 Battlefields UKRAINE/RUSSIA: It's the DRONES /Lt Col Daniel Davis
July 1, 2025
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24:20Now Playing2025 Battlefields UKRAINE/RUSSIA: It's the DRONES /Lt Col Daniel Davis
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as posted by the channelDaniel Davis Deep Dive Merch: Etsy store
Fiber Optic Drones & Tactical Innovation
Fiber optic drones aren't "wonder weapons" due to limited payload (e.g., only ~500g of explosives), but they excel in environments with heavy electronic jamming.
In Kursk, Ukraine used massive electronic warfare (EW) to jam Russian systems. Fiber drones would strike EW vehicles first, then regular FPV drones followed to finish off remaining targets.
Russia adapted quickly—the battlefield innovation cycle is now just 1–2 months, sometimes even shorter.
Russian Drone Evolution
Russia has heavily modified Iranian Shahed drones, now known as “Jiran” or “Giran” drones—far advanced from their origins.
Variants include:
Jet-powered models
Wankel engine versions (distinctive high-frequency whine)
Possible psychological warfare drones with built-in sirens (echoing Nazi Stuka bombers)
Technological Arms Race
Both sides continuously innovate to overcome each other's countermeasures (e.g., jamming, software changes, evasive maneuvers).
This back-and-forth highlights a war of attrition based on:
Production capacity
Manpower
Adaptability
Technological agility
State of the Ground War
Ukraine hasn't gained territory since October 2023 but hasn't collapsed. It offsets manpower shortages with drone parity.
Russia holds the advantage in artillery, tanks, missiles, and production, but can't make large advances due to Ukraine's effective drone defenses.
Modern war now requires small-unit maneuvering, not massed tank columns—hence the prevalence of motorbikes and infantry on foot.
Implications for NATO
NATO should not rely solely on traditional big-ticket items like tanks and jets.
Instead, it must:
Build trenches and fortifications
Massively invest in drone and anti-drone systems
Embrace rapid innovation
Train personnel to think like adaptable Ukrainian drone operators
Drone Interceptors & Ground Defense
Ukraine now uses interceptor drones (fast, short-battery drones) paired with Israeli radar to hunt Russian UAVs like Orlan and Lancet.
Russia countered with rear-facing cameras and evasive AI maneuvers.
On the ground, EW backpacks and jammers are mostly ineffective. The only reliable defense for infantry is to run, as jammers often reveal positions or fail to block all frequencies.
Bottom Line
This is a technologically dynamic war where survival depends on constant adaptation, small unit tactics, and drone warfare supremacy—not just raw firepower.
Both Russia and Ukraine demonstrate that nimbleness and innovation are as critical as numbers.
NATO, if it’s to prepare seriously, must absorb these lessons rapidly.
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