December 8, 2024
5,905
273
63
5.69%
Every word spoken in this episode is indexed. Type any phrase to jump straight to the moment it was said.
Type any word or phrase that may have been spoken. Click a result to seek the player to that exact moment.
Try a name, a topic, or a quoted line
Episode Timeline
Every episode in order around the one you’re watching — click any card and the page flips straight to it.
42:51Now Playing➡️ If you enjoy this podcast and you want to help to make its existence possible, join our community of geopolitics enthusiasts on PATREON
Sign up to my upcoming geopolitics newsletter
Thank you Conducttr for sponsoring the podcast. Take a look at Conducttr's services and its crisis exercise software at
This is a conversation with Eliot Cohen. Eliot is a military historian, a dean of the school of advanced international studies at John Hopkins University, a former official at the U.S. department of state and one of the most influential thinkers shaping U.S. foreign policy in recent decades.
But in this interview we talk about one specific topic: why did most analysts and experts completely failed to predict how the war in Ukraine would turn out following the Russian invasion. He recently published an extremely interesting paper dedicated to this issue, co-authored with professor Phillips O’Brien and so we dove deep into it: we talked about why most experts wildly overestimated Russian military capability and underestimated Ukraine’s readiness and resilience, why do we tend to either over and under-estimate Russia, whether the invasion could have actually turned out differently or what do most analysts still keep getting wrong.
Link to Eliot Cohen's paper
Sentinel Indexing in Progress
Metadata and chapters are available. Claim extraction for this episode is pending.
All video content is delivered via YouTube embedded players in accordance with the YouTube Terms of Service. Sentinel provides research tools that promote discovery and accountability across political media.
