German Newsreel 2.1944 EUROPA WOCHE № 52 KERCH BRIDGEHEAD

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Episode 286

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Europa Woche Nr. 52

February 22, 1944

Germany Academy

Battle of the Parpach Narrows, 27 February – 11 April

Stavka reinforced the Caucasus Front Front with nine rifle divisions. Soviet engineers built an ice road across the frozen Kerch Strait, enabling 96,618 men, 23,903 horses and 6,519 motor vehicles to reinforce the Kerch peninsula forces. The 47th Army was deployed to the area, initially with only two rifle divisions. The Stavka created the Crimean Front under, with Kozlov as its commander, on 28 January, with the 44th, 47th and 51st Armies belonging to it organically and the Separate Coastal Army and Black Sea Fleet falling under its operational command. Kozlov had little command experience beyond the regimental level and his staff was as inept. Stavka representative Lev Mekhlis arrived at the Crimean Front HQ in late January and introduced his own ideas into the planning stage. Stalin and Mekhlis wanted to liberate Crimea with an offensive on 13 February, but the Soviet forces were unequal to the task. Soviet troops lacked food and three 76mm artillery regiments had no ammunition at all. The backward nature of the Kerch peninsula's road network, the muddy roads and the Luftwaffe's bombing campaign against ports and Soviet cargo shipping prevented a sufficient logistical buildup and made Stalin's demand unrealistic. On 27 February Kozlov finally had available for his operation the required 93,804 troops, 1,195 guns and mortars, 125 anti-tank guns, 194 tanks and 200 aircraft. These forces were assembled in nine rifle divisions at the front along with numerous tank brigades containing T-26, T-34 and 36 KV-1 tanks. The Soviets were far from ready. Their tanks and aircraft lacked fuel supplies, many weapons did not work, the Soviet artillery had not organized a fire system, communications between Kozlov's HQ and the Crimean Front armies were repeatedly cut off, and engineers had not constructed field works of any kind. Under pressure from Stalin, Kozlov started his attack anyway.

First Offensive, 27 February – 3 March

The 51st Army planned to attack in the north on 27 February across a flat, 80-square kilometer plain dotted only by a handful of small villages. The Germans fortified the villages of Tulumchak, Korpech’ [ru], and Koi-Asan. The German 46th and 132nd Infantry Divisions held the XXXXII Corps front along with the Romanian 18th Infantry Division. Gruppe Hitzfeld waited in reserve. The Axis defensive preparations were extensive and in accordance with German tactical doctrine. Reinforced German strongpoints had all-around defenses, neutralizing the effects of simultaneous Soviet frontal and flank attacks, and the Germans created a system of engineering works permeated with augmented artillery fires. Mattenklott made the mistake of putting the Romanian 18th Infantry Regiment into a difficult and exposed position in a salient on the northern part of the line. The Soviet planners, led by Tolbukhin, failed to account for the warm weather that turned the terrain into a sea of mud.

51st Army's offensive kicked off at 0630 hours on 27 February with a 230-gun artillery preparation of which most were light 76 mm guns and only 30 were heavy 122 mm guns. The fortified German strongpoints were largely unharmed by the light high-explosive rounds. German artillery responded with its own fire and the Soviets lacked the counter-battery capabilities to suppress them. The open terrain provided no cover for the Red Army soldiers, who were systematically killed and wounded in great numbers by incessant German artillery strikes. The heavy Soviet KV-1s sank into the mud and could not get forward. Vehicles were also stuck and Soviet artillery shells had to be carried by hand. Confused Soviet soldiers trampled their comrades to death in the mud.